The concepts of the state, social contract, and citizenship constitute some of the central notions in political philosophy. The ideas of the social contract and citizenship are typically discussed in conjunction with the state particularly the “modern state” and in debates over whether the state is necessary within political theory. Moreover, both concepts are among the primary tools used to legitimize state authority. For this reason, they are far from neutral or innocent notions. In contemporary times, these concepts have often been distorted and recklessly employed to manufacture societal consent. To contemplate these concepts without the framework of power or the state, it is first necessary to examine, in broad terms, how they have been historically utilized in relation to the state.
In this context, one of the fundamental problems of political philosophy is the question of whether the state is necessary. This issue also encompasses the question of whether sovereignty is necessary. In fact, it represents the visible aspect of both the problems of sovereignty and the state. What is ultimately at stake in discussions of the state is the question of whether power itself is necessary.
The state represents only the visible face of power, the aspect that is framed and constrained by law. It is the locus where power is centralized on a macro level. Yet power itself is a mechanism that permeates society like an octopus, existing at both macro and micro levels. The macro dimension of power is manifested in politics exercised through the state, political parties, parliaments, and all other political institutions and organizations. The micro dimension, on the other hand, is expressed in everyday relationships such as those between spouses, parents and children, superiors and subordinates, teachers and students, or authors and readers.
Bu nedenle iktidarın dar kapsamda ve onun yürütücüsü, icracı mekanizması devlet olduğundan, burada devletin gerekli olup olmadığını irdelerken bir anlamda hiyerarşi ve tahakküm mekanizmalarında icra edilen iktidarın gerekli olup olmadığını da irdeleriz.
We will later examine the forms of governance proposed by those who argue for the necessity of the state. For now, let us first explore the approaches of those who contend that the state is not necessary.
In the history of philosophy, Taoism stands out among those who have argued that the state is unnecessary. In fact, Taoism adopts a critical stance toward all the institutions of state-based civilization. It views the education provided within such civilizations as a source of human alienation from nature. Taoism advocates living in harmony with nature, as humans supposedly did during the “Golden Age,” promoting a way of life deeply intertwined with the natural world.
Another philosophical tendency that regards the state as unnecessary is represented by the Cynics, often referred to as the “dog-like” philosophers. This approach rejects society as a whole, deeming all institutions—including the family—superfluous. It emphasizes living independently, much like a dog, as an autonomous individual.
Another philosophical tendency that considers the state unnecessary is anarchism. While encompassing diverse approaches, anarchist thinkers converge on the notion that the state is superfluous. The writings of philosophers and theorists such as Bakunin, Stirner, Kropotkin, Proudhon, and Nock exemplify this perspective. They argue that the state represents theft, a monopoly on murder and violence, and a structure that obstructs competition and natural market relations.
Stirner’s individualist anarchism is problematic because it advocates the rejection of society altogether. Similarly, Nock’s anarcho-capitalism fails to recognize the impossibility of a stateless capitalism. Class distinctions and conflicts, as exemplified in Western Europe, tend to prioritize the state while leaving space for monopolistic structures.
Proudhon’s anarchism is problematic in that it defends the traditional family structure and fails to recognize the gender contradiction, as well as how it takes precedence over class contradictions. Yet historical evidence shows how the notions of the “first class” and the “first colony” were constructed through women. The dynamics of power inherent in the oppressor-oppressed gender contradiction and the way this alone prioritizes the state are well established in historical experience.
Marx and Engels argue that the state emerges from the very fabric of society, existing initially to manage communal affairs, but gradually alienates itself from society and becomes a coercive force above it. Ultimately, they contend that the state, as a superstructural institution, is constructed upon the class antagonisms revealed in the societal base. In this sense, the state functions as an apparatus of domination, with one social class exerting control over another. To transition from capitalism to the higher stage of communism where the principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” operates that they advocate the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the highest stage of communism, they argue, the coercive organs of the state will disappear, leaving only a coordinating body to manage communal affairs; in other words, the state will wither away.
However, in the Soviet Socialist Republics Union—the most developed example of real socialism—it is indisputable how the state, under the guise of the dictatorship of the proletariat, transformed into a bureaucratic dictatorship, and how socialism itself evolved into a form of bureaucratic-state capitalism or collective capitalism. Numerous examples demonstrate how the bureaucracy—specifically, the upper-tier party comrades—acted like a bourgeois class, maintaining a distinct lifestyle through salaries despite the collective ownership of the means of production, and effectively passing their status on to their children as if it were an inheritance. Although they emerged from the very heart of the people, as the machinery of the state solidified and they became identified with it, they alienated themselves from both the populace and the class. The emergence of totalitarian dictatorship and dynastic tendencies characteristic of pro-capitalist structures is also well documented.
Another problem related to the question of the state in political philosophy is the issue of who should govern it. This problem arises within the context of the acceptance of the state itself. A related dimension concerns the question of who should hold sovereignty.
Three main tendencies can be identified regarding this issue. The first asserts that “sovereignty belongs to God.” In the East, this tendency was prevalent during the ancient and medieval periods, while in the West, it dominated the Middle Ages.
The second tendency advocates that sovereignty should reside with an elite. In the East, this developed in conjunction with the first tendency, operating in close relation to it. This approach presents two variations: should the elites be represented by a single individual, or by a specific minority group? In the West, both forms often emerged: aristocracy in Greece and monarchy in other countries. In the East, monarchy remained dominant until the second half of the 19th century, after which constitutional monarchy became prevalent.
The third tendency proclaims that “sovereignty should reside unconditionally with the people or the nation.” This approach, which manifests as democracy, also encompasses various shades and nuances within itself—a complexity we will examine later.
A related issue in political philosophy, tied to the question of who should govern the state, concerns whether sovereignty should be absolute or constitutional. As the phrasing of the question suggests, two main tendencies emerge in this debate.
The first tendency holds that sovereignty should be absolute, meaning it should have no limits and be subject to no conditions or regulations. The second tendency asserts that sovereignty should be limited, with mechanisms of accountability in place that is, sovereignty should be constitutional. Both tendencies have proponents among elites as well as among the populace within democratic frameworks. To examine these, we will first consider the perspective of those who see the state as necessary, and then explore, within the context of political philosophy, examples that illustrate both tendencies in relation to the three approaches to the question of who should hold sovereignty, as discussed above.
In this context, our first example is the theocratic state or “God’s state.” There are two versions of such a state. In the first version, seen in the states established in Mesopotamia as well as in the Egyptian and Roman Empires, the god is the king or emperor. In cases where the king is considered divine, the absolutism of sovereignty manifests in a particularly coercive, dictatorial form, as criticism is entirely eliminated—there is no justification or recourse.
In the second version, as seen in Mesopotamian states and in societies where the Abrahamic religions became official ideology, the god and the king are separate. The king acts as the shadow of God, His earthly representative. Drawing on sacred texts and the words of prophets, the king assumes political sovereignty in an absolute sense. Here, at least, criticism is possible, since the king is not literally God and could, in principle, act arbitrarily or fail to follow divine law. Nevertheless, sovereignty remains unlimited: the king is the sole authority to act on behalf of God. In these examples, sovereignty is vested in a single monarch, ruler, or sultan, giving rise to absolute monarchies. From the second half of the 19th century onward, theocratic states based on Abrahamic religions evolved into constitutional monarchies when their sovereignty was limited by representative assemblies. Examples include the Russian Tsardom and the Ottoman Empire.
In a theocratic state, the separation of powers cannot be said to exist. Legislative, executive, and judicial authority are all concentrated in a single hand. Even in a constitutional monarchy, where a parliament or government may appear to exercise separation of powers, the essence of the mechanism remains unchanged, as the monarch retains ultimate decision-making authority and the power to dissolve the parliament or government.
One of the most fundamental criticisms of theocratic states concerns the position of those who do not believe in God. Disobedience to the state is equated with disobedience to God, and vice versa, creating a significant problem. Similarly, the situation of individuals of different faiths presents a challenge. Examined across the three Abrahamic religions, there are both commonalities and differences in the treatment of non-adherents, and these differences can give rise to significant issues.
Plato’s elitist state is built upon his conception of the soul. Plato’s notion of the soul is divided into three parts: reason, spirit, and appetite. In this schema, reason corresponds to gold, spirit to silver, and appetite to bronze. Similarly, society is structured into three classes: philosophers, warriors, and producers, reflecting the tripartite nature of the soul.
Philosophers govern the state, soldiers ensure its security, and producers—engaged in agriculture, animal husbandry, and horticulture—are responsible for sustaining society. Slaves, women, and foreigners are excluded from the political community. Foreigners, in particular, are labeled as “barbarians.”
Platon, söz konusu toplumsal sınıfları bilgisever, ünsever ve parasever olarak adlandırır. Bilgiseverler filozoflar, ünseverler askerler ve paraseverler ise üreticilerdir, tüccarlardır.
In Plato’s political philosophy, the ideal form of government is aristocracy. If one is to consider an ideal state, aristocracy takes precedence. Sovereignty, in Plato’s view, is absolute. Whether it is a philosopher-king ruling alone or an aristocracy composed of philosophers, their power and authority must be absolute and unlimited.
Plato’s rulers are prohibited from forming families and are not allowed to possess private property. He considers it essential that rulers undergo a specific education and cultivate aesthetic sensibilities and refined tastes.
Plato considers the elimination of the physically disabled as a requirement for the ideal state, believing it necessary for the health of society.
The most fundamental criticisms of Plato concern his exclusion of women, his legitimization of slavery, and his marginalization of foreigners, whom he labels “barbarians.” These features underscore that his political philosophy is authoritarian, reproduces oppressor-oppressed dynamics, and is fundamentally elitist.
In such a society, the prohibition on rulers forming families or owning private property presents a significant problem. In a society based on private ownership, rulers might come to see themselves as the sole proprietors of the state and could adopt an arbitrary style of governance. The elitist and absolute exercise of sovereignty provides ample ground for the development of such a mindset.
Moreover, reducing society to a rigid three-class structure is unrealistic. Social mobility has always existed—and continues to exist—in every society based on private property.
The exclusion of foreigners and the elimination of the sick and disabled are inhumane practices that reveal the fascist and despotic tendencies in Plato’s ideal state, suggesting that the historical roots of fascism can be traced back to him. When combined with the absolutism of sovereignty, these features demonstrate that Plato’s model is not a functional state, even within its own conditions. Its extreme idealization and the construction of rigid walls between social classes create a reality-detached system. Indeed, such excessive idealization inherently produces a disconnection from reality.
Aristotle, who shared the elitist perspective of his teacher Plato, nonetheless presents some distinctions in his political philosophy. His approach is grounded in the four causes: the material cause, the formal cause, the efficient or agentive cause, and the final cause. The material cause of the city-state lies in its establishment on a specific geographic territory, the sustenance of its population, and the existence of defined social classes within society. The formal cause is the city-state’s constitution, which structures and organizes the community. The efficient or agentive cause is the governance of the city-state by its rulers. Finally, the final cause, or purpose, of the city-state is to provide its citizens with a good and happy life.
Aristotle, who advocates for absolute sovereignty, classifies forms of government into six types: three positive and three negative. The three negative forms represent corrupted versions of the positive forms. In this framework, he views monarchy—rule by a single individual—as a positive form, provided it adheres to both oral and written laws. However, he rejects tyranny, the degenerated form of monarchy, because in tyranny governance is based on arbitrariness rather than law.
Aristotle does not reject rule by a minority; what matters to him is the quality of that minority. He endorses aristocracy but rejects oligarchy, as the latter represents a corrupted form—a degenerated dictatorship of a minority. In oligarchy, governance is guided not by law but by the rulers’ own whims and interests. According to Aristotle, oligarchy cannot provide citizens with a good or happy life.
Aristotle regards forms of majority rule such as the republic as positive, but he never endorses democracy. He sees democracy as the corrupted, degenerated form of the republic—a dictatorship of the majority, which he famously refers to as “the barefooted” ruling over the minority. He connects this conclusion to Socrates’ execution under the democratic system of Athens.
Despite his classification of government into two sets of three—positive and negative—Aristotle’s preferred form of governance is aristocracy, or rule by the noble. However, he specifies that those who can govern the state must be philosophers or possess a level of knowledge comparable to that of philosophers; in other words, aristocracy should consist of rulers endowed with this intellectual and moral capability.
Historical evidence shows that rule by elites has caused no fewer problems than popular rule. Governments labeled as “of the people” often generate even greater issues as they become distanced from the populace, elitist, dynastic, or bureaucratic, solidifying their status and power—sometimes even surpassing the oppression of tyrants. The core truth is that as long as the oppressor-oppressed contradiction exists, along with the power structures that produce it and the state as its embodied, visible form, any system of governance—regardless of its type or the social class in which authority resides—will continue to generate problems.
The solution to this handicap or paradox is democracy. But what kind of democracy? To answer this question, we must first examine historical examples and the solutions proposed within the framework of political philosophy. Before doing so, it is important to address absolute rule by a single individual, as historically, democratic experiments often followed periods of absolute monarchy.
First and foremost, Hobbes considers the state necessary. He advocates for sovereignty to be exercised in an absolute manner and opposes any limitation on it under any circumstances. Furthermore, he envisions sovereignty embodied in a single individual—the monarch. Because he defends absolute sovereignty, his model of monarchy is referred to as an absolute monarchy.
Hobbes grounds this concept of absolute monarchy in human nature and temperament. In other words, he assumes that humans are inherently selfish beings. According to this view, individuals strive not only to satisfy their material needs but also to assert dominance over others in order to fulfill a desire for recognition. However, since these tendencies inevitably conflict, they create a constant state of strife and chaos—a condition Hobbes famously describes as “the war of all against all.” In this struggle, humans are, in a sense, equal: some rely on physical strength, others on intellect, and yet others on cunning to form alliances and turn circumstances to their advantage. Thus, in Hobbes’ view, the natural state of humanity is one in which man is a wolf to man. Consequently, human life is marked by insecurity, loneliness, poverty, brutishness, and brevity.
Humans are rational beings with a desire to live. To achieve a long life in peace and security, they employ reason to seek compromise and cooperation with others. Therefore, what we call society is essentially the product of these mutual concessions—a consensus arising from the agreements individuals make with one another.
For such a compromise to function effectively, a power is necessary. According to Hobbes, this is the origin of the state and sovereign authority. In this framework, the state serves as the force that ensures all parties adhere to the agreement established by the social contract. At the same time, humans delegate this power from among themselves, granting the individual who embodies the state the authority to exercise sovereignty.
Hobbes advocates for sovereignty to be vested in a single individual, arguing that their authority should be absolute and unlimited. He justifies this view by noting that if sovereignty were held by a group, disagreements within the group could lead to conflict. Such conflict would weaken the power of authority, resurrecting the original problem. While it is possible for a sole sovereign to misuse power for personal gain, a group of sovereigns introduces even greater risks, with more dangerous and demanding consequences.
In this regard, Hobbes equates right with power. Thus, if absolute and unlimited power itself constitutes right, the sovereign is entitled to exercise it. However it is used, such a right derives its legitimacy from power itself and will always stand beyond challenge. It is not subject to any form of questioning or contestation.
The most fundamental criticism that can be directed against Hobbes’s political philosophy concerns the conception of human nature on which it rests. Human history and its “Golden Age” disproves Hobbes’s view of human nature. While human beings do indeed possess a selfish side oriented toward self-preservation and the continuation of biological existence, they also embody qualities of solidarity, altruism, and self-sacrifice, even to the point of giving their lives for their people, kin, or friends. It is the totality of these features that constitutes the human being. Reducing humanity to only one of them does not yield an adequate conception of the human; rather, it leads to a distorted understanding. The negative and selfish aspects of humanity are, in fact, provoked by the social environment of state-based, class-stratified civilization. In particular, capitalist modernity, through both its “values” and its lifestyle, exacerbates these traits, stripping human beings of their humanity and transforming them almost into the monsters or giants of fairy tales.
On the other hand, even if we accept the premise of human beings having a selfish nature, the conclusion cannot be absolute sovereignty. In other words, the antithesis of selfishness is not the transfer of absolute power to a single individual. A person with such a selfish disposition cannot be presumed to exercise this power justly or necessarily; therefore, absolute power may lead to the very same destructive outcomes. Human history is replete with countless examples of this.
Another criticism that can be directed at Hobbes’ political philosophy is his identification of right with power, or more precisely, his view that the source of rights lies in power. This is fundamentally flawed. Class-based, state-centered civilization has been built upon injustice; it has managed to sustain itself not because it is just, but merely by virtue of power. Conversely, those who are indeed in the right have often remained oppressed or marginalized, precisely because they failed to translate their legitimacy into power. The history of the oppressed abounds with countless examples of this very condition.
For this reason, the slogan “We are right, therefore we shall prevail!” is nothing more than a wish, a hope. Being in the right does not necessarily bring power, nor does power in itself confer legitimacy. Yet, righteousness can provide a fertile ground for the accumulation of power; it can generate motivation. At the same time, power is often capable of concealing many injustices, fostering indifference, or silencing opposition. A condition of silence may emerge precisely because of power. The so-called “silent majority” in society derives its stance from this fact: it refrains from resistance simply because the opposing side is powerful. Instead, it prefers paths and methods where the risks, dangers, or costs are relatively minimal.
Regardless of the reasoning from which it emerges, to conflate right with power—to refuse to draw any distinction between them—marks the very end of political philosophy. If everything is reducible to power, then even injustice will be rendered just by virtue of force; in such a case, there would be no need for theories, doctrines, research, or inquiry within the realm of political philosophy. Yet, one reality cannot be ignored: unless right and power converge, unless justice acquires power, injustice will always remain dominant.
Rousseau’s understanding of democracy, which situates sovereignty within the people while affirming the necessity of the state, is at the same time founded upon the principle of absolute sovereignty. For this reason, within the history of political philosophy, it has often been described as democratic totalitarianism. His notion of totalitarianism never, under any circumstances, entails a limitation of the people’s sovereignty.
Rousseau’s political philosophy is grounded in a social contract, which he constructs by taking the state of nature as his point of departure. Yet his conception of human nature stands in complete contrast to that of Hobbes. For Rousseau, the state of nature is characterized by freedom, equality, and happiness, and it is rooted in communal life. In other words, his notion of the state of nature refers to the “Golden Age”—the earliest form of communal society represented by clan life. Since a return to this condition is no longer possible, Rousseau advances, through the social contract, the idea of a new form of life—civilizational and political life.
Rousseau’s solution to the social contract, often described as democratic totalitarianism, differs both from Hobbes’s model and from Locke’s liberal democracy. Whereas Hobbes’s solution rests upon sovereignty represented by a single ruler and exercised in an absolute manner, Rousseau’s model embodies sovereignty in the majority—absolute not in an individual, but in the collective. By contrast, in Locke’s liberal democracy, the sovereignty of the majority is not absolute but constitutional and conditional. It is subject to oversight through various civil institutions and mechanisms exercised by the people.
According to Rousseau, a form of society must be established in which the freedom and interests of each individual can be preserved by the common power, just as they were in the state of nature.
Therefore, the common power established within society does not constitute a force above the state. Since the sovereign structure is formed by the same individuals who make up the state, there can be no interest contrary to theirs. Consequently, freedoms are not eliminated. Freedoms are codified into laws that are created in accordance with the decisions made collectively through the common will of the people, and they are secured through these laws.
Here, the following problem arises: in society, there are not only harmonious and compatible interests but also conflicting and incompatible ones. Issues such as freedom and equality, which everyone can accept, do not pose a problem. But how can incompatible relationships and interests be brought into harmony? Rousseau’s answer to this problem is that the general will is not the sum of individual wills; it is formal in nature. In other words, the general will is based on common interests and ensures their protection. Therefore, everyone must balance their passions and align their personal interests with the common good, bringing them to a level of reconciliation and compromise.
Besides the general will, individual wills also exist. Individual wills can be opposed to the general will. However, individuals must subject their personal wills to the social contract in the common good—freedom, equality, and happiness. The place where the general will is represented is the popular assembly. Nevertheless, the general will may not always be fully expressed in these assemblies. Opinions contrary to the general will and alternative proposals for laws may also be presented. Such a situation is not contrary to a democratic system. In a democratic system, the will of the majority is binding. According to Rousseau, the binding nature of the majority does not eliminate the freedom of the minority because the democratic system was established with the approval of a majority that includes the minority when the social contract was formed. Therefore, no inherent contradiction exists. Moreover, the minority is variable; it does not always consist of the same group of citizens. Those in the minority for one law may be in the majority for another.
Rousseau sees sovereignty as residing in the people. He conceives of sovereignty as absolute and incapable of being limited. The people do not delegate their sovereign right to any institution because they regard sovereignty as an indivisible and inalienable right. From this perspective, he emphasizes that every law passed by the assembly should be approved by the people through a referendum. Consequently, he does not recognize the separation of powers. He insists that legislative, executive, and judicial authority all belong to popular sovereignty. He also does not recognize the partial wills of unions, communities, or professional organizations within civil society. He does not see them as part of or representatives of the people’s will. Rousseau even exaggerated the concept to the extent that he suggested that the power he calls the state could determine religion and even establish a state religion in accordance with the general will.
The most fundamental critique of Rousseau’s democracy is its totalitarian nature. The expression of tendencies within society and their articulation are not linked to any mechanisms. Democratic mechanisms that would allow groups within civil society to express their own views as tendencies are obstructed. In the submission of decisions passed by the assembly to a referendum and popular approval, not everyone may see themselves represented. Therefore, since the majority does not incorporate pluralism, one can speak of the majority dictating over the minority. Furthermore, the concentration of power in a single hand, combined with the absence of concrete and transparent institutions to monitor that power, also constitutes a problem. This model is particularly incompatible with the structure of capitalist modernity. Such democratic totalitarianism can, in a few steps, transform into fascism as exemplified by Mussolini. Moreover, it is incompatible with the developmental dialectic of the capitalist state. Its triad of capital, political, and military bureaucracy consolidates its sovereignty using media power. Today, as in the past, the sovereignty of the people or the nation is limited to the right to elect the guardians of these monopolies. Strategic decisions are always made behind closed doors and presented for approval within the monopoly’s “enclosure.” What remains are laws and decisions that do not alter the essence of the matter, and submitting these to a referendum does not pose a problem.
Another thinker who defends the sovereignty of the people within the framework of state sovereignty is John Locke. In political philosophy, Locke’s conception of democracy is referred to as liberal democracy. Let us now examine this understanding of democracy.
Like the others, Locke also refers to a state of nature. His state of nature is very close to that of Rousseau. In such a state, people’s capacities and means are relatively equal. They possess freedom and equal rights, and a sense of solidarity exists among them. Locke sees the transition from the natural state to civilization as arising from the invention of money and its use. In fact, what Hobbes calls the state of nature finds its practical expression under the conditions of civilization. The phrase “man is a wolf to man” applies within the context of civilized society. In this environment, everyone considers it permissible to do anything in pursuit of their own interests. This condition of conflict provides the basis for the social contract.
In his social contract, Locke bases the political structure on the sovereignty of the majority. He does not stop there; he also considers the separation of powers essential. Within this framework, he regards the legislative branch as the supreme authority. He argues that once laws are enacted, the legislature should dissolve. The execution and enforcement of these laws, he asserts, should be carried out by the executive branch, which operates under the authority of the legislature.
Besides these two powers, Locke also speaks of a third power to manage relations and alliances with other countries, which he calls the federative power. The reason he proposes the federative power is that he considers the concentration of power in a single entity to be dangerous.
The legislative body is composed of representatives elected by the people. The executive body cannot impose punishments that contradict the laws established by the legislative body. The actions of the executive are subject to the oversight of the judiciary, which must remain impartial. If it is determined that the executive acts contrary to the law, it can be removed from office by either the legislative body or the people. Locke sees the reason individuals choose civilization as their preference in the belief that it better protects their lives, freedoms, and property. This implies that fundamental rights and freedoms cannot be taken away by the sovereign power or the state. He also argues that these rights, in civilized society, can only expand and develop further. Locke maintains that the existence of the state is justified by its role in protecting these rights, and that the right to resist the state in case of interference is both essential and legitimate. This gives us Locke’s theory of toleration. According to this theory, the sovereign power or the state cannot interfere with the philosophical beliefs or religious convictions of its citizens. It is required to be tolerant in this regard. Citizens, in turn, must respect each other’s philosophical and religious beliefs. Freedom of thought and belief is considered indispensable.
Generally, Locke’s contributions to democratic thought cannot be overlooked. These include preventing the concentration of power in a single authority, establishing mechanisms to oversee and check powers, ensuring that the sovereign power or state under no circumstances interferes with fundamental rights and freedoms such as beliefs and opinions, and affirming the legitimate nature of sovereignty.
Building on this foundation, Montesquieu established a systematic framework for the separation of powers. Since Montesquieu, who followed Locke, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers have been represented separately.
Putting aside the reasons for the transition to civilization, Locke’s liberal democracy, even with Montesquieu’s contributions, cannot go beyond being a bourgeois democracy under the conditions of capitalist modernity. In practice, the separation of powers does not function effectively, because the executive becomes dominant over the legislature. Although the legitimate nature of sovereignty emphasizes fundamental rights and freedoms, in conditions of heightened conflict—especially regarding the right to life—no right is truly guaranteed. Even in times of peace, the individual’s spirit is subordinated through the state’s ideological apparatuses, thereby emptying the institutions of democracy of their essence. Under neoliberal policies, democracy is reduced solely to establishing a ballot box and exercising the right to vote. Thus, under rigidly fascist conditions and in the shadow of arms, setting up a ballot box becomes possible. However, merely setting up a ballot box and voting does not mean that democracy truly exists. It creates a complete illusion and masks the reality of the situation.
To address historical and contemporary problems on the basis of political philosophy, the most suitable system is radical democracy. It is also the solution of democratic modernity. Radical democracy does not only encompass political democracy; it also prioritizes democracy in economic, social, legal, sexual, and ethical spheres. Politically, this takes the form of democratic confederalism, which is shaped on the principles of self-governance and federal structures. Socially, it prioritizes freedom of religion, belief, and culture. It expresses itself in the multilingual, multi-faith, and multicultural structure of the democratic nation.
Economically, it resolves the labor-capital contradiction through democratic communalism. It concretizes the solution to the oppressor-oppressed gender dynamic in the freedom of women, based on liberty and equality. Politics is bound to ethics and controlled by moral values. Law is considered subordinate to ethics, with its role minimized.
Democratic confederalism rejects and excludes all forms of centralized macro- and micro-power within the state. It prioritizes pluralism and multiculturalism. Power is distributed based on non-centralization. Professional armies are rejected; self-defense is emphasized without detaching it from production. Distribution is not wage-based; rather, individuals’ needs are met according to economic capacities.
Self-governance assemblies, federal assemblies, and confederal assemblies function according to this principle. In line with direct democracy, all decisions are made together with citizens. Governance and the executive are responsible only for implementing, executing, and coordinating the decisions. Here, the apex of the pyramid is inverted: citizens are the principal actors in politics. The executive also participates, but its main function is implementation and coordination of decisions.
In the understanding of democracy in democratic modernity, those who make up the political institution cannot treat politics as a profession. It does not accept a permanent or routine “political class.” Politics is a matter that all citizens can engage in or undertake. Leaders come to power through elections and leave office through elections. Citizens also have the right to recall their elected representatives before the end of their term.
In democratic modernity, sovereignty belongs to the people. Its limits are clearly defined in the constitution. In self-governance, sovereignty resides with the citizens of that self-governing body. The exercise of sovereignty is based on common interests and can never be delegated to a single institution or assembly. The power of decision-making, authority, and control resides collectively with the citizens. Power is never concentrated in a single hand; it functions according to the principle of distribution of powers. This creates a situation in which everyone may exercise power or no one does. Here, the identity of subject and object plays a role—each individual is simultaneously a subject and an object in the exercise of sovereignty.
From the discussions so far, we can draw the following conclusions regarding social contracts and citizenship. Contrary to common belief, the social contract was not established by sitting down with society and reaching a collective decision. Rather, it has often been nothing more than a caste or ruling elite imposing its own ideas, views, and even interests on the entire society under the name of the social contract. This pattern has persisted from the very first days of what is called the modern state.
With capitalist modernity, however, the resistance of artisans, intellectuals, and educated elites led to the rights gained through constitutional struggle being theorized as a social contract. Even when the rights won by the working class through struggle were formulated as part of a social contract, they were still treated in conjunction with a state structure. In fact, this process contributed to the state’s legitimacy and fostered a sense of consent within society.
The transition from subjects to citizens represents a form of progress; however, citizenship often does not extend beyond mere membership in the state. It primarily entails fulfilling the duties imposed by the state—by the caste or ruling elite—rather than exercising autonomous rights. In particular, under neo-fascist conditions, these duties precede rights and are enforced more subtly compared to classical fascism.
For this reason, both the social contract and citizenship must be considered outside of and in opposition to power and the state. The social contract should be based on discussion with the entire society, through various means and tools, rather than being dictated by a small caste of rulers. It must articulate the general interests of society, particularly on the basis of freedom, equality, and justice within a radical democratic framework. The social contract represents the common ground of all societal colors, built upon the unity of differences and diversity. Unlike the homogeneous society assumed under the nation-state model of capitalist modernity, it relies on the primacy of a society whose nature preserves itself autonomously.
In this sense,citizenship does not mean loyalty to a state representing the interests of a ruling caste through the constitution. Rather, it signifies membership in a democratic society as defined by its constitution. It expresses the relationship between a free citizen and a free society, along with the love for the homeland (“yurt”) where this society resides. Unlike in state-centered civilizations, where the social contract and citizenship are framed as relations of power, here they are equal relationships grounded in radical democracy, reflecting the mutual interdependence of a free society and free citizens. The moral values derived from the culture of the democratic society, and the democratic law grounded on these values, determine the nature of this relationship.
For these reasons, it is essential to conceive the social contract and citizenship outside the framework of power and the state. Any approach other than this merely produces hierarchy and domination within the domain of power and the state. The social contract and free citizenship will find their true meaning on the grounds of democratic modernity, the democratic nation, and democratic confederalism.
