Section 1: Pre-Zionist Jewish Politics and Fragmented PursuitsDivergent Orientations of European Jews
The nation-state paradigm that emerged in Europe after 1789 pushed Jews to a new crossroads in history. In Western Europe, Jews who embraced assimilation began adopting local languages and styles of dress, gradually becoming “French” or “German.” In this period, particularly in Germany, the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment) movement—led by Moses Mendelssohn—advocated for the intellectual integration of Jews into European culture.
Yet these assimilationist efforts failed to prevent the institutionalization of antisemitism. As Jews gained economic strength, they encountered both religious and racial discrimination across various parts of Europe.
The Sephardic Legacy in the Ottoman Empire and Relative Tolerance
In 1492, the Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Cities such as Istanbul, Edirne, and especially Thessaloniki became home to large Jewish communities. During this period, Jews played active roles in fields such as craftsmanship, printing, and medicine. The Ottoman “nation system” granted Jews a degree of autonomy, though their political representation remained limited.
While Jews occupied a lower social position compared to both Muslim and Christian subjects, they faced far less persecution than the pogroms that swept across Europe. Even so, this relatively tolerant environment would begin to shift by the late 19th century.
The Bund and Other Alternatives: Zionism Was Not the Only Path
Until the early 20th century, Zionism was not the sole dominant view within the Jewish world. In Eastern Europe in particular, socialist organizations were gaining ground among Jewish workers. One of the most significant was the Bund (General Jewish Labour Bund), founded in 1897. Bundists defined Jewishness not as a religious identity but as a cultural one, arguing that the struggle against antisemitism should be fought on a class basis rather than a national one.
Active in Russia, Poland, and Lithuania, the Bund followed a secular line that emphasized the Yiddish language and working-class values. At the same time, Reform Judaism while maintaining devotion to God,largely rejected the idea of a Jewish nation, particularly in the context of the 1885 Pittsburgh Platform. Traditional Orthodox movements, such as Agudath Israel, opposed the notion of establishing a Jewish state before the coming of the Messiah; by contrast, Religious Zionism, (ex. the Mizrachi movement) embraced a different theological position.
Uganda and Argentina: Alternative State Plans
Even the Zionist movement led by Theodor Herzl was not initially fixed on Palestine. In 1903, the British proposal known as the “Uganda Plan”—which, despite its name, referred to a territory in British East Africa (present-day Kenya)—was discussed as a short-term refuge for Jews fleeing pogroms in Eastern Europe.
The Uganda Plan sparked fierce debate within the Zionist movement. The “Neinsager” (“Those Who Say No”) faction opposed Herzl, insisting that no location other than Palestine could be acceptable. Argentina also appeared in Herzl’s early writings as a potential destination, and the Jewish Territorial Organization, led by Israel Zangwill, briefly explored options outside Palestine. However, both religious and historical factors reinforced Palestine’s central place in Zionist thought, leaving these alternatives as minority positions.
Section 2: The Geopolitical Significance of Jerusalem and Tensions in the Three-Faith City
A Historical Symbol: Jerusalem of Three Religions
Situated at the crossroads of the three great Abrahamic faiths, Jerusalem has for centuries been not only a spiritual center but also a political arena. For Jews, it is home to the Western Wall, the remnant of Solomon’s Temple; for Muslims, it hosts Al-Aqsa Mosque, the first qibla; and for Christians, it contains the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, believed to be the site of Jesus’s crucifixion. This combination makes the city unique on a universal scale.
Yet this sacredness has not made Jerusalem a city of peace, but rather a field of rivalry. In the modern era, religious affiliation has increasingly become the vehicle for ethnic and political claims.
Western Interferences from the 19th Century Onward
With the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, Western powers began establishing influence in Jerusalem through consulates, missionary schools, and churches. By the mid-19th century, the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church, French Catholic missions, and British Protestant influence had deeply altered the city’s balance.
Jerusalem was no longer merely an Ottoman provincial center; it had become a diplomatic stage on which European powers competed with one another. The so-called “Holy Places Crisis” served as a pretext for interfering in the Ottoman Empire’s internal affairs.
The Tanzimat Era and Land Ownership in Jerusalem
With the enactment of the 1858 Land Code, the registration and transfer regime for miri (state-owned) lands was formally regulated in detail. Due to limited access for the local population to land registry procedures and the presence of bureaucratic obstacles, lands in and around Jerusalem increasingly came into the hands of urban notables (ayan) and large landowners; in subsequent years, this laid the groundwork for accelerated purchases by Jewish investors.
From the 1880s onward in particular, Jewish organizations began acquiring land near Jerusalem. This process marked the emergence of the first tensions between Arab peasants and the new settlers.
Shifting Demographic Balance in the City
By the late 19th century, the Jewish population in Jerusalem had increased markedly. Reliable and comparable recorded data from the 1922 British census indicates that Jews constituted more than half of the city’s population (approximately 54%). This growth occurred not only through natural increase but also as a result of immigration from Europe.
Competition between Arabs and Jews in the city was intensifying in both housing and commerce. Religious differences further deepened divisions in economic life.
The Status of Jerusalem: Debates on Internationalization
When the Palestinian question entered the international agenda, the status of Jerusalem was always discussed as a special case. The 1947 UN Partition Plan allocated Jerusalem to neither the Arabs nor the Jews; instead, it envisaged a corpus separatum—a separate status under international administration.
However, this plan was never implemented. Following the 1948 War, Jerusalem was divided between Jordan and Israel. In 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, bringing the entire city under its control; yet, in terms of international law, it continues to be regarded as a disputed territory.
Section 3: Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period – Tribes, Land, and Centralization Policies
From the Tanzimat to Abdulhamid: State Intervention in Land
From the mid-19th century onward, the Ottoman Empire began moving toward a Western-style centralized state model, with the Tanzimat reforms at its core. The 1858 Land Code regulated the registration, transfer, and usage rights of miri (state-owned) lands; this did not mean the wholesale conversion of miri land into private property. In provincial territories such as Palestine, urban notables (ayan) and city-based speculators had relatively easy access to registration processes, while peasants were often left outside the system.
The Ulama of Jerusalem, Tribes, and the “Aşraf” Elite
In Jerusalem and its surroundings, the class of religious scholars known as the aşraf, who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad, became significant political and economic actors. As the state delegated responsibilities such as tax collection and security to local power centers, this elite amassed considerable wealth.
During this process, Palestinian peasants were caught between the pressures of the central state and the networks of local elites. The new order established by the Ottoman central administration through its reforms offered the Arab peasantry neither liberation nor hope for stability.
Rising Jewish Capital in the Land Market
From the 1870s onward, land purchases in Palestine began through Jewish organizations. These acquisitions were generally made from large landowners based in Lebanon, Damascus, or Jerusalem. Many Arab peasants became aware of the sales only when the new owners attempted to evict them.
Jewish settlers systematically excluded Arab labor through the “Hebrew Labor” (Avoda Ivrit) policy. This created not only an economic rupture but also a sociological one. The same land came to carry completely different meanings for different communities: for one side, it represented a promised homeland; for the other, it meant the loss of livelihood and belonging.
Ottoman Security Policy and the Exclusion of Arabs
Under the Committee of Union and Progress, especially after 1908, efforts to strengthen central control in Arab provinces intensified. The imposition of Turkish in educational institutions, the removal of Arabs from bureaucratic positions, and the replacement of local administrators with officials from Anatolia caused significant unrest in the region.
These policies fueled the rise of Arab nationalism and fostered cultural resistance toward Istanbul. In intellectual circles across Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, the Arabic language, literature, and identity began to be reconstructed. Although this resistance did not immediately translate into a direct political independence movement, it contributed to the gradual distancing of Arab populations from the Ottoman identity.
“Ottomanism” Failed, “Turkification” Provoked Resentment
The Committee of Union and Progress’s shift from “Ottomanism” to “Islamism,” and ultimately to policies of “Turkification,” severed the last bonds of trust between the state and the people in the Arab provinces. In cities such as Jerusalem, Nablus, and Jaffa, the Arab notables increasingly perceived the bureaucracy in Istanbul as a foreign authority.
By 1914, popular support for the Ottoman Empire across Arab lands had significantly weakened. In Palestine, the social structure had fragmented, peasants had become landless, and Arab intellectuals had grown distant from the Ottoman elite.
Section 4: Arab Politics During the Mandate and the British Dilemma — From al-Husseini to the White Paper
Post-War Period: Institutionalization of Arab Representation
Following World War I, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and the territory of Palestine came under British mandate. This decision, taken at the 1920 San Remo Conference, was formalized by the League of Nations in 1922. However, the Arabs never recognized its legitimacy, as Palestinian independence had previously been promised to them in the Sharif Hussein–McMahon correspondence.
Palestinian Arabs began establishing political representation mechanisms to oppose the British mandate. The Palestine Arab Congress, founded in 1920, quickly became influential. Yet the institution that held the real power was the Supreme Muslim Council, established in 1921. Hajj Amin al-Husseini was appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921 and became head of the Council in 1922.
Hajj Amin al-Husseini: From Grand Mufti of Jerusalem to Symbol of Resistance
Al-Husseini served both as the guardian of Al-Aqsa Mosque and as the spokesperson for the Palestinian cause. Initially, Britain viewed him as a “manageable leader” who could exert influence over Arab society. However, this calculation proved unsuccessful.
The increase in Jewish immigration, the expansion of settlements, and Britain’s attempts at neutrality gradually radicalized al-Husseini. Following the clashes during the 1929 Western Wall riots, his stature within the Arab public rose even further. His outspoken opposition to the British and Zionists made him both a symbol of resistance and, later, a controversial figure.
The British Mandate’s “Divide and Rule” Policy
Britain adhered to the Balfour Declaration, supporting Zionist immigration, while simultaneously pursuing a “balancing policy” to suppress Arab anger. This dual strategy eroded trust in Britain on both sides.
While the Arabs struggled to achieve political representation, the Jewish Agency gradually evolved into a shadow government. Managing health, education, security, and agricultural policies independently of the British mandate, the Jewish Agency laid the groundwork for state-building in Palestine.
The 1936 Arab Revolt: From Strike to Uprising
In 1936, fueled by economic crisis, unemployment, and land losses, the Arab revolt erupted. Initially beginning as a general strike, the movement quickly escalated into armed resistance. Attacks against British authorities and Jewish settlements marked the beginning of a conflict that would last three years.
To suppress the uprising, Britain implemented extraordinary measures:
- Numerous villages were surrounded and searched,
- Thousands of Arabs were arrested or exiled,
- The Arab political structure was largely dismantled.
During this period, Palestinian Arabs were left without leadership or organizational capacity. Al-Husseini was forced to flee to Lebanon, and the Supreme Arab Committee was dissolved.
The 1939 White Paper: Britain’s Retreat
In the aftermath of the uprisings, Britain was forced to reconsider its strategy in Palestine. The 1939 White Paper limited Jewish immigration to 15,000 people per year for five years (a total of 75,000); any further immigration would require Arab consent. In addition, regional restrictions were imposed on Jewish land purchases, and a future promise of independence for Palestine was made, though the timetable remained unspecified.
Chapter 5: Nazism, the Holocaust, and Jewish Migration — From Tragedy to State-Building
Europe After 1933: The Beginning of a Catastrophe
With Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933, a new and dark era began for Jews across Europe. The Nazi regime systematically implemented anti-Jewish laws:
- Jews were dismissed from government positions,
- Excluded from academia, the press, and public life,
- Stripped of citizenship rights under the Nuremberg Laws.
This discrimination was not confined to Germany. Anti-Semitism also surged in countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Events like Kristallnacht in 1938 demonstrated that Jews were physically threatened as well.
The Journey to Palestine: Escape, Not Migration
During this period, Jewish agencies organized to accelerate immigration to Palestine. However, the 1939 White Paper imposed strict immigration quotas. As a result, thousands of Jews attempted to reach Palestine illegally via the Mediterranean.
These journeys were perilous:
- Smuggling ships were overcrowded,
- The British Royal Navy enforced a naval blockade,
- Immigrants who reached the ports were often detained or sent to camps in Cyprus.
Many ships sank at sea or were turned back. These tragedies, combined with the horrors of the Holocaust, reinforced Zionist leaders’ arguments for the necessity of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.
The Holocaust: Six Million Lost, One State Sought
Between 1941 and 1945, nearly six million Jews were systematically murdered by the Nazis. Concentration camps such as Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Sobibor became some of the darkest chapters in human history.
At the end of the war, the Jews who remained in Europe were largely displaced and stateless. They could not return to their homes, and most countries refused to accept them. Palestine began to be seen not only as a historical promise but as the only viable place to live.
Zionist Strategy: “No State, Then Genocide”
Zionist leaders, particularly Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, transformed the Holocaust into a powerful political argument on the international stage. The narrative that “this genocide occurred because Jews were denied a state” resonated widely in the Western world.
Jewish communities in the United States amplified this message through media and cinema. Publications such as The New York Times and Life printed Holocaust images, mobilizing public opinion and conscience.
Britain Under Pressure, the U.S. Steps In
After the war, Britain struggled to maintain control over Palestine: Arabs continued their uprisings, Jewish settlers attacked British targets, and costs were rising. In 1946, the Irgun carried out a bombing at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing 91 people. Voices in the British public calling for withdrawal from Palestine grew louder.
The 1942 Biltmore Program and U.S. Support
At the Zionist Conference held in May 1942 at the Biltmore Hotel in New York, the goal was explicitly shifted from a “Jewish homeland” to an “independent Jewish state.” U.S. President Harry Truman expressed his support for the acceptance of Jewish refugees and the establishment of a state in Palestine. This support reflected not only humanitarian concerns but also domestic political calculations.
“Palestine should be the Ground for a State Project”
In the eyes of Jews who survived the Holocaust, Palestine was no longer just “the promised land” but a place where history and humanity’s debt could be fulfilled. Jewish immigration increased, and paramilitary organizations such as the Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi gained strength. Political pressure, diplomatic lobbying, and claims of historical legitimacy converged to lay the groundwork for the establishment of Israel.
Section 7: The Sociology of the Nakba — Displacement, Memory, and Intergenerational Trauma
750,000 Displaced Lives
After the 1948 war, approximately 750,000 Palestinians were forced to leave or were expelled from their homes. This became one of the largest displacement movements in modern Middle Eastern history. Refugees were scattered across Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and Gaza. Many began living in tented camps or makeshift shelters.
In 1949, the United Nations established the UNRWA to address the needs of Palestinian refugees. However, displacement was not a temporary condition—it evolved into a permanent social structure.
Map of Lost Villages
Between 1948 and 1950, more than 400 Palestinian villages were destroyed, occupied, or forcibly evacuated by the State of Israel. Most of these villages were completely erased; Jewish settlements were built in their place, or the lands were repurposed in various ways. The original village names were changed, their topographies erased, and their memories systematically obliterated.
Historical examples:
- Deir Yassin: Evacuated in 1948; the area is now primarily occupied by the Kfar Shaul hospital complex. Later, the neighborhoods of Givat Shaul Bet and Har Nof were built on parts of Deir Yassin’s lands.
- Al-Qastal: Its remains are today part of Castel National Park, near Mevaseret Zion.
Maps of these lost villages still hang on the walls of Palestinian refugee homes. The concept of the “right of return” is not only a claim to land but also a reference point for reconstructing identity.
Memory and Resistance in Literary Form
The loss of Palestine was not merely a military defeat; it was also a profound cultural trauma. This trauma transformed into a form of resistance expressed through poetry, short stories, and visual arts.
🖋️ Prominent figures:
- Mahmoud Darwish: “I lost my identity, but not my voice.”
- Ghassan Kanafani: “For those who do not return, the path becomes a shadow.”
Literature became a symbolic geography in which refugees could reconstruct their homes, trees, and winds.
Visual Memory: Photographs, Maps, Keys
Refugees still preserve the keys to their homes. Although these keys are often rusted and worn, they symbolize in one generation’s memory the possibility of return.
In every refugee camp, a single photograph, an image of a fruit tree, or a document resembling a title deed serves as the core of family memory.
Demands for the “Right of Return” are not merely political; they are cultural, emotional, and ontological claims.
Intergenerational Transmission of Trauma
Today, the number of Palestinian refugees recognized by UNRWA has surpassed approximately 5.9 million. The vast majority of these people were born, raised, and aged within refugee status. Even though they have never “migrated” themselves, they are deprived of their homeland.
According to sociologists, this is one of the rare cases producing “inherited victimhood.” The first generation experienced loss; the second generation struggled for identity; and the third generation, now scattered across the world, has nonetheless built a diaspora with a resilient memory.
Nakba: More Than Just a Trauma
The Nakba is not merely a historical event of 1948; it is a continuous phenomenon that shapes the present. For Palestinians, it is a historical cycle experienced anew every year.
Although the “right of return” is recognized by the UN, Israel considers it a “demographic threat” and rejects all refugee claims. This refusal indicates that the issue persists not only in the past but also in the present and future.
Section 8: Zionist Propaganda and International Legitimacy – Exporting Memory
Institutionalizing the Memory of the Holocaust
After 1945, one of the most powerful discursive tools Israel used to establish its international legitimacy was the trauma of the Holocaust. The extermination of six million Jews became not only a human tragedy but also a justification for the Jewish national movement.
The Israeli state institutionalized this memory:
- In 1953, the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial Center was established,
- Educational curricula were centered on the Holocaust,
- International remembrance days were transformed into diplomatic instruments.
In this process, the Holocaust became a cornerstone both of Israeli citizenship identity and of its foreign policy.
Media, Cinema, and Memory Diplomacy
Israel effectively constructed its narrative in Western media. In particular, in the United States, newspapers, magazines, and television networks influenced by Jewish communities helped shape Israel’s image as engaged in a “struggle for existence.” Publications such as Life, Time, and The New York Times presented the founding of Israel as a “manifestation of justice.”
Hollywood also became part of this strategy:
🎬 Exodus (1960) — the cinematic peak of the Zionist narrative,
🎬 Schindler’s List (1993) — the global carrier of Holocaust memory.
Through these narratives, Western public opinion often viewed Israel as “defensive” and Palestinians as “agents of violence.”
Academia and Think Tanks
Israel established close ties with international universities. Institutions such as Tel Aviv University and Hebrew University were integrated into the global academic network. Through collaborations with prestigious universities, particularly in the United States, Zionist narratives gained legitimacy within the intellectual sphere.
Suppression of the Palestinian Narrative
During the same period, the Palestinian narrative was marginalized for a long time. Palestinian writers, historians, and academics struggled to gain visibility in international forums. The Nakba did not become as universal a narrative as the “Jewish Holocaust.”
📌 For example:
• The destruction of Arab villages was framed as “evacuation operations,”
• Palestinian resistance was coded as “terrorism,”
• The “right of return” was portrayed in international media as a “demographic threat.”
Alternative Memory Initiatives
Since the 1990s, some Israeli scholars, known as the “New Historians” (e.g., Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim), have critically examined the Zionist narrative. Debates concerning 1948, especially Pappé’s claim of “ethnic cleansing,” gained greater international visibility. Palestinian artists, writers, and documentarians also became more visible in the digital age. Nevertheless, the hegemonic narrative largely continued to favor Israel’s perspective in most arenas.
International Legitimacy Debates
Although UN Resolution 194 recognizes the right of return for Palestinians, it has not been implemented. In recent years, reports by human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and B’Tselem have described Israel’s regime in the occupied territories as “apartheid,” sparking intense debates on the international stage.
Section 9 :Post-1967 – The Annexation of Jerusalem, the Collapse of Oslo, and the Breakdown of the Two-State Model
The Six-Day War of 1967: The Map Changes Once Again
In June 1967, the six-day war between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan profoundly altered the geographic and political balance of the Middle East. Following the conflict, Israel captured:
- East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan,
- The Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt,
- The Golan Heights from Syria.
This victory marked the first time Israel gained full control over Jerusalem and led to the city being declared its “undivided capital.” However, according to international law and UN resolutions, East Jerusalem is still considered an occupied territory.
Settlement Policy: The Architecture of De Facto Annexation
After 1967, Israel began rapidly expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank. This process was justified both on religious grounds (with references to the Torah) and strategic security considerations. Settlement activity accelerated under the Begin government in 1977, and by the 1990s, more than 100 settlements had been established. Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem were increasingly encircled. These settlements were not merely residential areas; they became part of an integrated system including roads, water infrastructure, and military checkpoints.
The Oslo Process: A Fragile Hope
The Oslo Accords, signed in Washington in 1993, brought Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) face to face officially for the first time in history. According to the agreement:
- The Palestinian Authority (PA) would be established,
- The Israeli military would gradually withdraw,
- Jerusalem, refugees, and borders would be left for final status negotiations.
However, this process was never fully implemented. Israel continued settlement expansion, the Palestinian Authority lost legitimacy among the population, Hamas rose, and right-wing coalitions in Israel did not remain committed to Oslo. The 2000 Camp David talks collapsed, leading to the outbreak of the Second Intifada.
Why the Two-State Solution Has Stalled
For many years, the two-state solution was the most supported option by the international community, but today it is almost effectively blocked:
- Over 700,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,
- East Jerusalem being de facto under Israeli control,
- Geographical fragmentation of Palestinian territories,
- Lack of political unity between Gaza and the West Bank.
Under these conditions, establishing a sovereign, continuous, and territorially defined Palestinian state has increasingly become impossible.
Today: Two States “A Dream or a New Reality?”
In the 2020s, the Israeli government has moved to normalize settlements, removing the “controversial” label. While the two-state solution is still rhetorically supported in the international community, on the ground, criticisms of a single, discriminatory regime are increasing. Some human rights organizations describe this structure as “apartheid” in their reports.
Root of the Problem and Path to Resolution
The deep-rooted cause of the conflict lies in forcing a multi-religious and multi-ethnic region into the mold of a nation-state designed to produce singular sovereignty and identity.
The nation-state model prioritizes security and borders, assuming that the population within its territory must be a homogeneous “people.” Those outside this framework are often coded as minorities, migrants, or threats. In the Palestine-Israel context, this logic has institutionalized the “us/them” distinction through population and land policies, as well as citizenship regimes. Sacred sites and historical narratives have also become tools to legitimize this political framework.
From the Mandate period to Oslo, the discourse of security has repeatedly postponed civil rights and demands for equal citizenship. Lasting peace depends on transcending sovereignty-centered solutions and embracing rights-based equality and principles of shared sociality.
Conclusion: Those Who Remember and Those Obliged to Remind
The ideological movement that began in the kibbutzim evolved by 1948 into a state, by 1967 into annexation, and by the 2000s into a permanent occupation. The situation today transcends the limits of conventional diplomatic solutions, calling instead for a resolution grounded in historical and ethical considerations.
For Palestinians, this concerns not only land but also memory, belonging, and existence. For Israelis, it involves security, identity, and international legitimacy.
Among these conflicting positions, is there still hope for peace? Perhaps the more fundamental question is:
“Is peace truly possible, or can it only gain meaning when accompanied by justice?”
